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WONG V. TABOR: THE LATEST WORD IN
PHYSICIAN-ATTORNEY COUNTERSUITS
JEAN RAWSON*
The recent increase in medical malpractice litigation has caught
the attention of the general public, attorneys and physicians. In-
dividuals legitimately injured as a result of malpractice can seek
legal counsel in an attempt to insure compensation for any injuries
sustained. Malpractice suits result. The frequent criticism expressed
in the medical community is that such suits are often brought
against any and all parties with little regard to actual liability. The
physician's legal retaliation has always been a countersuit for
malicious prosecution.
Wong v. Tabor1, a 1981 Indiana Court of Appeals decision, is the
latest word on the courts' current attitude toward physician-attorney
countersuits. The Wong court redefined the essential elements
necessary to prove malicious prosecution. Wong v. Tabor is an im-
portant decision for attorneys and physicians because the court
established a standard for attorneys in determining probable cause
to sue on behalf of their physician-clients. Most importantly, the
Wong v. Tabor decision sends an ominous message to physicians
contemplating retaliatory legal action.
In September of 1974, Attorney Glenn J. Tabor filed a suit on
behalf of Mrs. Myrtle D. Privett, alleging medical malpractice
against Dr. Samuel N.T. Wong, a Hammond physician, and others.
Two years later, in 1976, Dr. Wong retaliated with a malicious
prosecution action against Attorney Tabor. The facts of the medical
malpractice case deserve consideration.
In early 1972, Dr. Wong hospitalized Mrs. Privett to determine
the cause of her persistent headaches. Mrs. Privett's neurological
examinations were essentially normal. Dr. Wong then thought that
Mrs. Privett's headaches might be caused by her sinuses; conse-
quently, he referred her to an ear, nose and throat specialist. Dr.
Wong also rendered gynecological services to Mrs. Privett in April
and June of 1972. He did not see her again as a patient. On Septem-
ber, 24, 1972, Dr. Alan J. Kaufman, Mrs. Privett's neurosurgeon, ad-
mitted Mrs. Privett to St. Margaret's Hospital in Hammond, In-
* Attorney for Dr. Samuel N.T. Wong; (J.D. 1977) John Marshall Law
School; (B.S.) University of Mississippi; (M.S.) Indiana University.
1. Wong v. Tabor, __ Ind. App. -, 422 N.E.2d 1279 (1981).
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diana. On September 28, 1972, Dr. Kaufman performed an anterior
cervical fusion. Upon discharge from the hospital following the
surgery, Mrs. Privett was a quadraplegic.
One month after the surgery, in November of 1972, Dr. Wong
visited Mrs. Privett in the hospital and prescribed a laxative for her
when she complained of constipation. Dr. Wong did not render any
pre-operative treatment to Mrs. Privett for a neurological condition.
He did not recommend the performance of neurosurgery to remedy
Mrs. Privett's headaches, nor did he refer her to Dr. Kaufman. He
did not participate in the surgery, or the post-operative care of Mrs.
Privett, except for the treatment of her constipation mentioned
above. Dr. Wong was not qualified to engage in neurosurgery. His
name did not appear on the medical records until November of 1972,
one month after the surgery, when he prescribed mineral oil and a
soap suds enema for Mrs. Privett.'
Attorney Tabor, however, was told by Mrs. Privett's husband
that Dr. Wong could have participated in the surgery and that he
probably referred Mrs. Privett to Dr. Kaufman.' Attorney Tabor filed
suit on behalf of Mrs. Privett against Dr. Wong and others on
September 26, 1974. In October of 1974, Attorney Tabor voluntarily
dismissed two physicians, and in October of 1975, Attorney Tabor
settled with Dr. Kaufman and three other physicians. Dr. Wong,
however, remained in the lawsuit.
Dr. Wong's attorney requested by letter, in October 1975, that
Attorney Tabor voluntarily dismiss Dr. Wong since he had no part
in the surgery that rendered Mrs. Privett a quadraplegic. Having
received no response from Attorney Tabor, Dr. Wong's attorney filed
a motion to dismiss for failure to comply with an order to answer in-
terrogatories and moved for summary judgment. Eighteen months
passed from the filing of the lawsuit before Dr. Wong's attorney was
able to obtain a summary judgment for him in April of 1976. The
suit was reported in the local newspapers, Dr. Wong's medical mal-
practice insurance premiums increased by thirty percent, he received
less referrals, and his income decreased in the year following the fil-
ing of the lawsuit.
Dr. Wong sued Attorney Tabor and others for malicious prose-
cution in the month of May, 1976. Dr. Wong subsequently dismissed
everyone from the lawsuit except Attorney Tabor, after having
2. Id. at 1282.
3. Id. at 1281.
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determined that Attorney Tabor had the sole responsibility for
determining who to name as defendants and who to retain as defen-
dants in the malpractice action. The case went to trial in March of
1979, and the jury found for Dr. Wong and awarded $25,000 in
damages. Attorney Tabor moved for judgment on the evidence, and
the trial court granted the motion and set aside the jury's verdict.
Dr. Wong appealed, but the Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed.
The opinion is the court's latest word on physician-attorney
countersuits. The Court in Wong v. Tabor redefined the essential
elements necessary to prove malicious prosecution. In an action for
malicious prosecution, the plaintiff must show (a) that the defendant
instituted or caused to be instituted, a prosecution against the plain-
tiff; (b) that the prosecution was instituted without probable cause;
(c) that the defendant acted maliciously in instituting the action; (d)
that the prosecution terminated in the plaintiffs favor; and (e) that
the plaintiff was damaged by the action.' A substantial number of
4. The following cases list the elements of the tort of malicious prosecution
in various states. Although states variously divide the elements into categories, the
ultimate requirements of the tort are largely identical.
Ala. - Wilson v. Brooks, 369 So. 2d 1221 (Ala. 1979).
Ariz. - Bird v. Rothman, - Ariz. App. -, 627 P.2d 1097 (1981); Carroll v.
Kalar, 112 Ariz. 595, 545 P.2d 411 (1976).
Cal. - Cowles v. Carter, 115 Cal. App. 3d 350, 171 Cal. Rptr. 269 (1981); Weaver
v. Superior Court, 94 Cal. App. 3d 498, 156 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1979); Clark Equip. Co. v.
Wheat, 92 Cal. App. 3d 503, 154 Cal. Rptr. 874 (1979); Bertero v. National Gen. Corp.,
13 Cal. 3d 43, 529 P.2d 608, 118 Cal. Rptr. 184 (1975); Tool Research and Eng'r Corp. v.
Henigson, 46 Cal. App. 3d 675, 120 Cal. Rptr. 291 (1975); Babb v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.
3d 841, 479 P.2d 379, 92 Cal. Rptr. 1979 (1971); Munson v. Linnick, 255 Cal. App. 3d
589, 63 Cal. Rptr. 340 (1967); Ferraris v. Levy, 223 Cal. App. 2d 408, 36 Cal. Rptr. 30
(1963); Masterson v. Pig'n Whistle Corp., 161 Cal. App. 2d 323, 326 P.2d 918 (1958).
Conn. - Vandersluis v. Weil, 176 Conn. 353, 407 A.2d 982 (1978).
D.C. - Morowitz v. Marvel, 423 A.2d 196 (D.C. 1980); Ammerman v. Newman, 384
A.2d 637 (D.C. 1978).
Fla. - Fee, Parker & Lloyd v. Sullivan, 379 So. 2d 412 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
Ga. - Taylor v. Greiner, 156 Ga. App. 663, 275 S.E.2d 737 (1980); Cooper v. Public
Fin. Corp., 146 Ga. App. 250, 246 S.E.2d 684 (1978); Baranan v. Kazakos, 125 Ga. App.
19, 186 S.E.2d 326 (1971).
Idaho - Russell v. Chamberlain, 12 Idaho 299, 85 P. 926 (1906).
Ill. - Lasswell v. Ehrlich, 92 Ill. App. 3d 935, 416 N.E.2d 423 (1981); Stopka v.
Lesser, 82 Ill. App. 3d 323, 402 N.E.2d 781 (1980); Balthazar v. Dowling, 65 Ill. App. 3d
824, 382 N.E.2d 1257 (1978); Berlin v. Nathan, 64 Ill. App. 3d 940, 381 N.E.2d 1367
(1978; Lyddon v. Shaw, 56 Ill. App. 3d 815, 372 N.E.2d 685 (1978); Kurek v. Kavanagh,
Scully, Sudow, White & Frederick, 50 Ill. App.3d 1033, 365 N.E.2d 1191 (1977).
Ind. - Wong v. Tabor, - Ind. App. -, 422 N.E.2d 1279 (1981).
Iowa - Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F. Supp. 1376 (N.D. Iowa 1978).
Kansas - Tappen v. Ager, 599 F.2d 376 (10th Cir. 1979); Nelson v. Miller, 227
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jurisdictions further require that the plaintiff plead and prove a
"special injury."' However, this is the minority position.
The plaintiff must first show that the defendant instituted, or
Kan. 271, 607 P.2d 438 (1980).
Ky. - Raine v. Drasin, 621 S.W.2d 895 (Ky. 1981); Hill v. Willmott, 561 S.W.2d
331 (Ky. 1978).
La. - Junot v. Lee, 372 So. 2d 707 (La. Ct. App. 1979); Parks v. Winnfield Life
Ins. Co., 336 So. 2d 1021 (La. Ct. App. 1976).
Md. - North Point Constr. Co. v. Sagner, 185 Md. 200, 44 A.2d 441 (1945).
Minn. - Hoppe v. Klapperich, 224 Minn. 224, 28 N.W.2d 780 (1947).
Mo. - Stafford v. Muster, 582 S.W.2d 670 (Mo. 1979).
N.J. - Ackerman v. Lagano, 172 N.J. Super. 468, 412 A.2d 1054 (1979).
N.Y. - Belsky v. Lowenthal, 62 A.D.2d 319, 405 N.Y.S.2d 62 (1978); Hoppenstein
v. Zemek, 62 A.D.2d 979, 403 N.Y.S.2d 542 (1978); Kallman v. Burke, 47 A.D.2d 515, 363
N.Y.S.2d 588 (1975).
N.C. - Koury v. John Meyer of Norwich, 44 N.C. App. 392, 2961 S.E.2d 217
(1980).
Okl. - Anderson v. Canaday, 37 Okl. 171, 131 P. 697 (1913).
Or. - Erlandson v. Pullen, 45 Or. App. 467, 608 P.2d 1169 (1980).
Tenn. - Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Elgin Coal, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 17 (E.d.
Tenn. 1972); Peerman v. Sidicane, __ Tenn. App. -, 605 S.W.2d 242 (1980).
Tex. - Rodriguez v. Carroll, 510 F. Supp. 547 (S.D. Tex. 1981); Martin v. Trevino,
578 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); Morris v. Taylor, 353 S.W.2d 956 (Tex. Civ. App.
1962).
Va. - Ayyildiz v. Kidd, __ Va. -, 266 S.E.2d 108 (1980).
5. D.C. - Morowitz v. Marvel, 423 A.2d 196 (D.C. 1980); Ammerman v.
Newman, 384 A.2d 637 (D.C. 1978).
Ga. - Taylor v. Greiner, 156 Ga. App. 663, 275 S.E.2d 737 (1980).
Ill. - Lasswell v. Ehrlich, 92 Ill. App. 3d 935, 416 N.E.2d 423 (1981); Davis v. Ruff,
83 Ill. App. 3d 651, 404 N.E.2d 405 (1980); Balthazar v. Dowling, 65 Ill. App. 3d 824, 382
N.E.2d 1257 (1978); Berlin v. Nathan, 64 Ill. App. 3d 940, 381 N.E.2d 1367 (1978); Pan-
ton v. Demos, 59 Ill. App. 3d 328, 375 N.E.2d 480; Lyddon v. Shaw, 56 Ill. App. 3d 815,
372 N.E.2d 685 (1978); Kurek v. Kavanagh, Scully, Sudow, White & Frederick, 50 111.
App. 3d 1033, 365 N.E.2d 1191 (1977).
Iowa - Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F. Supp. 1376 (N.D. Iowa 1978); Brody v. Ruby, 267
N.W.2d 902 (Iowa 1978).
Md. - North Point Constr. Co. v. Sagner, 185 Md. 200, 44 A.2d 441 (1945).
N.J. - Ackerman v. Lagano, 172 N.J. Super. 468, 412 A.2d 1054 (1979).
N.M. - Farmers Gin Co. v. Ward, 389 P.2d 9 (N.M. 1964).
N.Y. - Belsky v. Lowenthal, 62 A.D.2d 319, 405 N.Y.S.2d 62 (1978); Hoppenstein
v. Zemek, 62 A.D.2d 979, 403 N.Y.S.2d 542 (1978); Coopers & Lybrand v. Levitt, 52
A.D.2d 493, 384 N.Y.S.2d 804 (1976); Drago v. Buonagurio, 89 Misc. 2d 171, 391
N.Y.S.2d 61 (1977), rev'd 61 A.D.2d 282, 402 N.Y.S.2d 250 (1978), rev'd 46 N.Y.2d 778,
386 N.E.2d 821, 413 N.Y.S.2d 911 (1978).
N.C. - Koury v. John Meyer of Norwich, 261 S.E.2d 217 (1980).
Ohio - Dakters v. Shane, 64 Ohio App. 2d 196, 412 N.E.2d 399 (1978).
Or. - O'Toole v. Franklin, 279 Or. 513, 569 P.2d 561 (1977); Erlandson v. Pullen,
45 Or. App. 467, 608 P.2d 1169 (1980).
Pa. - Triester v. 191 Tenants Ass'n., 272 Pa. Super. Ct. 271, 415 A.2d 698 (1979);
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caused to be instituted, a proceeding against the plaintiff.' Attorney
Tabor instituted a malpractice claim against Dr. Wong in 1974, thus,
the first element of malicious prosecution was established in the
Wong case.
Next, the plaintiff must show that the action was commenced
without probable cause. Dr. Wong asserted that Attorney Tabor did
not have probable cause to institute the action against him. Dr.
Wong further contended that even if there had been probable cause
to initiate the suit against him, Attorney Tabor was liable for
wrongfully continuing the matter once he discovered from the medi-
cal records that Dr. Wong did not participate in Mrs. Privett's
surgery. Although most reported actions are brought against the at-
torney who filed the proceeding, the tort of malicious prosecution
has never been limited to the wrongful initiation of a proceeding.'
An attorney who takes an active part in the initiation or continua-
tion of a civil proceeding against another is subject to liability if he
acts without probable cause.' The court in Wong v. Tabor stated
that the continuation of a proceeding involves different damages
since the adverse publicity and expenses of retaining counsel are in-
cidents of the initiation of proceeding." A party has remedies, such
as a motion for summary judgment, to avoid the consequences of
further prosecution. The court in Wong v. Tabor concluded that the
considerations upon which liability can be predicated for wrongfully
continuing a proceeding are quite narrow and do not include a
negligent failure to conduct discovery." The court did not find At-
torney Tabor liable for wrongfully continuing the suit against Dr.
Wong.
The question of whether an attorney has acted with or without
probable cause raises an issue of law to be determined by the court,
DeLeo v. Munley, 261 Pa. Super. Ct. 90, 395 A.2d 957 (1978).
R.I. - Jacques v. McLaughlin, - R.I. -, 401 A.2d 430 (1979).
Tex. - Rodriguez v. Carroll, 510 F. Supp. 547 (S.D. Tex. 1981); Butler v. Morgan,
590 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); Martin v. Trevino, 578 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1979); Moiel v. Sandlin, 571 S.W.2d 567 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
Va. - Ayyildiz v. Kidd, - Va. -, 266 S.E.2d 108 (1980).
6. See supra note 3.
7. See supra note 3.
8. See, e.g., Nelson v. Miller, 227 Kan. 271, 607 P.2d 438 (1980); Friedman v.
Dozarc, 83 Mich. App. 429, 268 N.W.2d 673 (1978). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS,
§ 674 (1971).
9. Id.
10. Wong, Ind. App. -, 422 N.E.2d 1279, 1290 (1981).
11. Id. at -, 422 N.E.2d at 1290.
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not the jury, according to the Wong court."2 In other words, the
judge determines whether a given set of facts justifies the prosecu-
tion of an action. The rule is different, however, when the existence
of material facts is in dispute. In that event, as in the Wong case,
the issue is whether the facts were actually known by the attorney
at the time of the filing of the lawsuit."3 That issue must be resolved
by the trier of fact.
The Wong case, a case of first impression in Indiana, sets an im-
portant precedent for all states regarding the element of probable
cause. 4 The Wong court established a test to determine what con-
stitutes probable cause for an attorney to institute a lawsuit. The
court held that the objective standard which should govern the
reasonableness of an attorney's action in instituting litigation for a
client is:
whether the claim merits litigation against the defendant in
question on the basis of the facts known to the attorney
when the suit was commenced. The question is answered
by determining that no competent and reasonable attorney
familiar with the law of the forum would consider that the
claim was worthy of litigation on the basis of the facts
known by the attorney who instituted suit."
The establishment of this standard preserves the rule that "an at-
torney may institute and present a case vigorously and in a manner
as favorable to his client as the rules of law and professional ethics
will permit." The court in Wong concluded that Attorney Tabor
had probable cause to sue Dr. Wong based on the facts known to
him when the suit was commenced.
To prove malicious prosecution, the plaintiff must also show
that the attorney acted with malice.'" It is not always necessary to
show hatred or ill will. Malice can be inferred from the lack of prob-
able cause. In the Wong case, the court concluded that Dr. Wong
12. Id. at , 422 N.E.2d at 1285.
13. Id. at -, 422 N.E.2d at 1288.
14. Id. at __, 422 N.E.2d at 1285.
15. Id. at 422 N.E.2d at 1288.
16. Weaver v. Superior Court, 95 Cal. App. 3d 166, 180, 156 Cal. Rptr. 745,
752 (1979).
17. Wong, - Ind. App. -, 422 N.E.2d 1279, 1288 (1981).
18. Junot v. Lee, 372 So. 2d 707 (La. Ct. App. 1979); Tiede v. Fuhr, 264 Mo.
622, 175 S.W. 910 (1915); Smits v. Hogan, 35 Wash. 290, 77 P. 390 (1904).
19. Cal. - Tool Research & Eng'r. Corp. v. Henigson, 46 Cal. App. 3d 675, 120
Cal. Rptr. 291 (1975); Masterson v. Pig'n Whistle Corp., 161 Cal. App. 2d 323, 326 P.2d
918 (1958).
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failed to meet his burden of proving lack or probable cause, so no
malice could be inferred.' The element of malice, then, was not sus-
tained in the Wong case.
The plaintiff in a malicious prosecution action must also both
plead and prove that the prior proceeding terminated in his favor.2
Although a voluntary dismissal may be considered a favorable ter-
mination,' a settlement or compromise is not." In the Wong case,
several physicians were voluntarily dismissed by Attorney Tabor.
Dr. Wong, however, had to move for a summary judgment, which
was granted by the court in 1976. In Wong v. Tabor the court states
that termination by summary judgment, not pursuant to a compro-
mise, is a conclusion on the merits.2' Since the court felt that the
Fla. - Central Fla. Mach. Co. v. Williams, 400 So. 2d 30 Fla. Dist. Ct. App. (1981).
Kan. - Nelson v. Miller, 227 Kan. 271, 607 P.2d 438 (1980).
Me. - Nyer v. Carter, 367 A.2d 1375 (Me. 1977).
Mo. - Henderson v. Cape Trading Co., 316 Mo. 384, 289 S.W. 332 (1926).
N.C. - Koury v. John Meyer of Norwich, 44 N.C. App. 392, 261 S.E.2d 217 (1980).
R.I. - Nagy v. MeBurney, - R.I. -, 392 A.2d 365 (1978).
20. Wong v. Tabor, - Ind. App. -, - 422 N.E.2d 1279, 1289 (1981).
21. Cal. - Lackner v. LaCroix, 25 Cal. 3d 747, 602 P.2d 393, 159 Cal. Rptr. 693
(1979); Babb v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 841, 479 P.2d 379, 92 Cal. Rptr. 179 (1971);
Cowles v. Carter, 115 Cal. App. 3d 350, 171 Cal. Rptr. 269 (1981); Christensen v. Gobar,
47 Cal. App. 3d 613, 120 Cal. Rptr. 923 (1975); Webb v. Youmans, 24 Cal. App. 2d 51, 57
Cal. Rptr. 11 (1967).
D.C. - Shulman v. Miskell, 626 F.2d 173 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
Ga. - Cooper v. Public Fin. Corp., 146 Ga. App. 250, 246 S.E.2d 684 (1978).
Ill. - Executive Com. Serv., Ltd. v. Daskalakis, 74 Ill. App. 3d 76, 393 N.E.2d
1365 (1979); Berlin v. Nathan, 64 Ill. App. 3d 940, 381 N.E.2d 137 (1978).
Ind. - Wong v. Tabor, - Ind. App. -, 422 N.E.2d 1279 (1981).
Kan. - Nelson v. Miller, 227 Kan. 271, 607 P.2d 438 (1980).
La. - Parks v. Winnfield Life Ins. Co., 336 So. 2d 1021 (La. Ct. App. 1976).
Mass. - Antelman v. Lewis, 480 F. Supp. 180 (D. Mass. 1979).
Mich. - Peisner v. Detroit Free Press, 68 Mich. App. 360, 242 N.W.2d 775 (1976).
Mo. - McMahon v. May Dept. Stores Co., 374 S.W.2d 82 (Mo. 1963).
N.Y. - Lieberman v. Roadside 3 Hour Cleaners, Inc., __ A.D.2d __, 438
N.Y.S.2d 134 (1981); Drago v. Buonagurio, 46 N.Y.2d 778, 386 N.E.2d 821, 413 N.Y.S.2d
911 (1978); Ametco, Ltd. v. Beltchev, 5 A.D.2d 631, 174 N.Y.S.2d 378 (1958), appeal
denied, 6 N.Y.2d 978, 161 N.E.2d 733, 191 N.Y.S.2d 945 (1959), aff'd, 7 N.Y.2d 783, 163
N.E.2d 339, 194 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1959).
Ohio - Board of Educ. v. Marting, - Ohio St. ., 185 N.E.2d 597 (1962).
Or. - Erlandson v. Pullen, 45 Or. App. 467, 608 P.2d 1169 (1980).
R.I. - Nagy v. McBurney, - R.I. ., 392 A.2d 365 (1978).
Wis. - Izard v. Arndt, 483 F. Supp. 261 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
22. Weaver v. Superior Court, 94 Cal. App. 3d 498, 156 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1979);
Minasian v. Sapse, 80 Cal. App. 3d 823, 145 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1978); Webb v. Youmans, 24
Cal. App. 2d 51, 57 Cal. Rptr. 11 (1967); Kurek v. Kavanagh, Scully, Sudow, White &
Frederick, 50 Ill. App. 3d 1033, 365 N.E.2d 1191 (1977).
23. Wong, n__ Id. App. - , 422 N.E.2d 1279, 1284 (1981).
24. IdKat , 422 N.E.2d 1279 at 1284.
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summary judgment was not the result of an agreement between the
parties, the court found that Dr. Wong sustained his burden of prov-
ing prior favorable termination.25
Finally, the plaintiff in a malicious prosecution action must
show that he has been damaged.' The majority rule is that the
plaintiff in a malicious prosecution action may recover attorney fees
and costs incurred in defending a groundless action." In the jurisdic-
tions that require a showing of "special damages," the plaintiff must
show an injury different from the normal incidents of defending a
lawsuit.28 Indiana follows the majority rule, and Dr. Wong sustained
his burden of proving damages by showing that his medical malprac-
tice insurance premiums increased by thirty percent after the filing
of the suit.'
The Wong v. Tabor case is important because of the court's
new standard for attorneys in ascertaining whether they have prob-
able cause to institute a lawsuit on behalf of their clients. Again,
that standard is "whether the claim merits litigation against the
defendant in question on the basis of the facts known to the at-
torney when the suit was commenced.""0 An important purpose of
our courts is to determine the rights and remedies of all persons.
The new Wong standard reinforces this public policy concern that
all litigants are to have free access to the courts.
The Wong decision affords attorneys special protection while
acting in their representative capacities. The attorney simply has to
believe reasonable facts told him by his client. He does not have to
investigate further before filing suit. The Wong court no doubt felt
that attorneys should not be fearful of being held liable as insurers
of the merits of their client's cases. The court did not want at-
torneys to be unwilling to undertake representation in close or dif-
ficult matters or where only a short amount of time remains before
action must be taken. In those situations, a "chilling effect" could
limit litigants' free access to the courts.
One of the problems with the new standard set by Wong v.
Tabor is that it is nearly impossible to prove the element of "lack of
probable cause" in a malicious prosecution action. Thus, frivolous
25. Id. at -, 422 N.E.2d 1279 at 1285.
26. See supra note 2.
27. Peerman v. Sidicane, - Tenn. App. __ 605 S.W.2d 242 (1980).
28. See supra note 5.
29. Wong, Ind. App .... 422 N.E.2d 1279, 1282-83 (1981).
30. Id. at , 422 N.E.2d 1279 at 1288.
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lawsuits against physicians are not discouraged by the Wong case:
While the tort [of malicious prosecution] assumes litigant
responsibility, it was not created for, nor does it contem-
plate, the need for a remedy designed to deter attorneys
from filing baseless lawsuits. The clear reluctance of the
courts to find attorneys liable for malicious prosecution is
evidence of the questioned efficacy of such an action in pro-
moting this end."
This implication is unfortunate. The filing of any spurious claim
perverts the legal process. A physician is especially vulnerable to
spurious claims. His name is obvious in the hospital chart, whether
he was the primary physician or not. He is an easy target. It is com-
mon knowledge that physicians carry malpractice insurance and that
there is money available for damages. The mere filing of an unwar-
ranted malpractice action against a physician becomes part of his
record which the state might consider when his license is up for
renewal. The filing of such a suit inevitably leads to impairment of
reputation, mental distress, loss of time and money, and increase of
malpractice insurance premiums or perhaps even cancellation of in-
surance. The detrimental personal effects upon a physician, his
privacy and his reputation are profound. The Wong case has done
nothing to alleviate these problems.
Another problem with the Wong standard is that it violates the
common law rule that no injury, improperly inflicted, shall go unre-
dressed, 2 by practically eliminating malicious prosecution actions.
Public policy grants all persons freedom of access to the courts. 3
Malicious prosecution plaintiffs are persons and should have access,
too. The Wong standard has the effect of denying a remedy for a
wrong. The tort of malicious prosecution was designed to place
restraints on malicious plaintiffs." If the law will not restrain and
punish malicious conduct, public confidence in the merits of our
system of jurisprudence will inevitably be shaken. The efficient ad-
ministration of justice will be threatened. Therefore, another unfor-
tunate result of Wong v. Tabor is the near annihilation of the tort of
malicious prosecution.
Although Wong v. Tabor, as well as other malicious prosecu-
31. Id. at -, 422 N.E.2d 1279 at 1283.
32. Lipsciemb v. Shofner, 44 S.W. 818, 819 (S.Ct. Tenn. 1896).
33. Teesdale v. Liebschwager, 174 N.E. 620, 621 (S.Ct. S.D. 1919).
34. Norton v. Hines, - Cal. App. -, 123 Cal. Rptr. 237, 240 (1975).
1983]
Rawson: Wong v. Tabor: The Latest Word in Physician-Attorney Countersuits
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1983
764 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW [Vol. 17
tion actions in other jurisdictions, have succeeded at the trial level,'
only two appellate courts have affirmed judgment in favor of a
physician and against an attorney." In fact, in the history of
American jurisprudence, few former adversaries have been able to
prove that an attorney has acted without probable cause and with
malice. 7 The Wong case is no exception.
Wong v. Tabor sends a message of caution to physicians. That
message is that any venture into the area of malicious prosecution is
speculative and unlikely to succeed. Careful consideration, then,
35. Fee, Parker and Lloyd v. Sullivan, 379 So.2d 412 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980);
Berlin v. Nathan, 64 Ill. App. 3d 940, 381 N.E.2d 1367 (1978).
36. Peerman v. Sidicane, - Tenn. App. - , 605 S.W.2d 242 (1980); Raine
v. Drasin, 621 S.W.2d 895 (Ky. 1981).
37. Ariz. - Carroll v. Kalar, 112 Ariz. 595, 545 P.2d 411 (1976).
Cal. - Lackner v. LaCroix, 25 Cal. 3d 747, 602 P.2d 393, 159 Cal. Rptr. 693 (1979);
Babb v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.3d 841, 479 P.2d 379, 92 Cal. Rptr. 179 (1971).
D.C. - Shulman v. Miskell, 626 F.2d 173 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (reserved as to statute of
limitations defense); Morowitz v. Marvel, 423 A.2d 196 (D.C. 1980); Ammerman v.
Newman. 384 A.2d 637 (D.C. 1978).
Fla. - Fee, Parker and Lloyd v. Sullivan, 379 So. 2d 412 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)
(judgment for physician reversed and judgment entered for attorney; lawsuit financed
by members of medical profession).
Ill. - Davis v. Ruff, 83 Il. App. 3d 651, 404 N.E.2d 405 (1980); Stopka v. Lesser,
82 Ill. App. 3d 323, 402 N.E.2d 781 (1980); Balthazar v. Dowling, 65 Ill. App. 3d 824, 382
N.E.2d 1367 (1978); Berlin v. Nathan, 64 Ill. App. 3d 940, 381 N.E.2d 1367 (1978); Pan-
tone v. Demos, 59 Ill. App. 3d 328, 375 N.E.2d 480 (1978); Lyddon v. Shaw, 56 Ill. App.
3d 815, 372 N.E.2d 685 (1978).
Ind. - Wong v. Tabor, - Ind. App. - , 422 N.E.2d 1279 (1981).
Iowa - Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F. Supp. 1376 (N.D. Iowa 1978); Brody v. Ruby, 267
N.W.2d 902 (Iowa 1978).
Kan. - Nelson v. Miller, 227 Kan. 271, 607 P.2d 438 (1980).
Ky. - Hill v. Willmott, 561 S.W.2d 331 (Ky. 1978).
La. - Spencer v. Burglass, 337 So. 2d 596 (La. Ct. App. 1976).
Mich. - Friedman v. Dorzorc, 83 Mich. App. 429, 412 A.2d 1054 (1979).
N.Y. - Drago v. Buonagurio. 46 N.Y.2d 778, 386 N.E.2d 821, 413 N.Y.S.2d 910
(1978); Fried v. Bower & Gardner, 46 N.Y.2d 765, 386 N.E.2d 258, 413 N.Y.S.2d 650
(1978); Belsky v. Lowenthal, 62 A.D.2d 319, 405 N.Y.S.2d 62 (1978) (suit against
patient); Hoppenstein v. Zemek, 62 A.D.2d 979, 403 N.Y.S.2d 542 (1978).
N.C. - Petrou v. Hale, 43 N.C. App. 655, 260 S.E.2d 130 (1979).
Ohio - Dakters v. Shane, 64 Ohio App. 2d 196, 412 N.E.2d 399 (1978).
Or. - O'Toole v. Franklin, 279 Or. 513, 569 P.2d 561 (1977).
Pa. - DeLeo v. Munley, 261 Pa. Super. Ct. 90, 395 A.2d 957 (1979).
Tex. - Rodriguez v. Carroll, 510 F. Supp. 547 (S.D. Tex. 1981); Butler v. Morgan,
590 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); Martin v. Trevino, 578 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1979); Moiel v. Sandlin, 571 S.W.2d 567 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
Va. - Ayyildiz v. Kidd, - Va. - , 266 S.E.2d 108 (1980).
Wash. - Smits v. Hogan, 35 Wash. 290, 77 P. 390 (1904).
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should be taken before any action is pursued. If malicious prosecu-
tion suits are judiciously instituted by physicians, that is, only in
situations of obvious abuse by attorneys, the court may very well be
more receptive. The courts must carefully balance the new standard
of probable cause to sue established by Wong v. Tabor with the in-
terest of physicians to be free from vexation, damage, and possible
ruin by frivolous lawsuits. Only if courts strictly apply the new
Wong v. Tabor probable cause standard, and only if there are some
successful malicious prosecution actions affirmed by the appellate
courts, will unwarranted malpractice actions against physicians ever
really be deterred.
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